Evolution of China – ASEAN partnership: Identifying challenges and unifying solutions in championing comprehensive strategic partnership

 

Evolution of China – ASEAN partnership: Identifying challenges and unifying solutions in championing comprehensive strategic partnership

In a polycentric world, partnerships are a crucial aspect to ensure sustainability. As a regional block, ASEAN and China have a long history of partnership. 30 years ago, both parties initiated a Dialogue Partnership (DP) five years after their first engagement in the block in 1991 (Frankel & Wei, 1996). In 2003, this partnership was upgraded to a Strategic Partnership. It mutually benefited ASEAN countries and China to revive their economy. China became its largest trading partner later in 2009 (Seth & Seah, 2021). After 30 years, in line with the celebration of the 30^th anniversary of the Dialogue Partnership, the decision to upgrade this relationship paved the way for the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership to foster.

The scope of this essay investigates the challenges, particularly economic differences, and the assessment of palatable solutions that may aid the identified challenges. This is done by analyzing China's different comprehensive strategic partnerships and the two parties' behavior towards each other over the past years.

1.     Challenges facing China – ASEAN Comprehensive Partnership

1.1 The Ambiguity of the terms

The system has an arbitrary line of what “comprehensive partnership” means. After the Cold War ended, China's diplomacy began to use the term "partnership." In 1993 China saw the formation of its first strategic alliance with Brazil until they had accumulated 47 partnerships around the globe. The problem with this ill-defined term as pointed out by Zhongping and Jing (2014) is that it is hard to draw the line of what strategic partnership is equally vital to China. For instance, China and Russia build a “strategic partnership of coordination” in 1997 yet the scope of coordination remains arbitrary. It was supported by Corkin (2011) who argued that China has also established a strategic partnership with Angola, yet it is least appealing as compared to Russia and other states.

1.2 Hyper-competitive competition and the huge amount of surplus

Meanwhile, Chiang (2019) argued in the study of major changes in China – ASEAN that there is a long-term trade surplus created from the imbalance of trade supplied by ASEAN and China. Since the creation of CAFTA, they have gradually eliminated tariff and non-tariff measures for most products. This was backed by Bi (2021) who also argued that since 2012, CAFTA has resulted from a deficit to a large surplus in reference to the textile exports of ASEAN and China that resulted in fierce competition.

1.3 Differing mindsets toward China

Moreover, there are ongoing political differences from the fear of imbalance in economic development level in each member state. In addition, the state of Southeast Asia Survey (2020) confirmed in their finding that there is established fear from the constituents of ASEAN of how the presence of China as an emerging superpower might be a disadvantage to the community of ASEAN. The elites pointed out that the bilateral agreements are insufficient as a basis for one to truly say that ASEAN and China have deepened their relationship thus the “comprehensive partnership” might lead to a huge amount of dependency that may lead ASEAN to cut its footing in having stronger economic agreements with China. Moreover, Suryadinata (2017) on China – Indonesia Partnership highlighted that the Indonesian EEZ surrounding the Natuna islands, which could harm relations between Jakarta and Beijing if handled improperly, are among the elements that could have a detrimental impact on the relationship of their strategic partnership that is likely among ASEAN members.

2.     Proposed solutions to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership

While these are all valid hindrances to the elevation of partnership, I posit that we can still have our strengthened ways to aid such matters.

2.1 Maximization of various cooperation mechanisms

There are now several platforms for collaboration between China and ASEAN, including CAFTA, BRI, RCEP, the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism (GMS), and others. China and ASEAN are now able to cooperate on a variety of levels and across large geographic areas thanks to the development of regional cooperation institutions (Liu, 2021). This proves that if we can continue to shape various cooperation mechanisms, we can bridge the differences between ASEAN states and China to ensure the efficiency of the comprehensive partnership.

2.2 Diversification of products

To combat the issue of a large amount of surplus they must ensure the diversification of products. Bi (2021) reported that China currently has relatively low trade shares with Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Brunei, thus there is room to expand trade with these nations by avoiding fierce competition among low-level similar products. This is like the findings of Honghua and Pengfei (2020) regarding the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Italy which only 2.7 percent of exports go to the Chinese market but are improved by the increasing complementarity of economic materials.

2.3 Third-party market cooperation

There is also emerging third-party market cooperation. According to Zhang (2019) on the Belt Road Initiative research, third-party market cooperation is a relatively new international cooperation model that encourages Western multinational corporations (MNCs) to participate in BRI to address BRI’s current challenges. This means as reinforced by Bi (2021) that developing the smart manufacturing market, power, internet, and clean energy markets in ASEAN nations can be accomplished by successfully combining China's mid-to-high-end production lines and equipment manufacturing capabilities with advanced technologies and core equipment of developed countries through the third-party market cooperation.

2.4 People to people exchange

Honghua and Pengfei (2020) suggested that maximizing people-to-people exchanges are crucial for better cultural understanding. In China-Italy Comprehensive Partnership this initiative has been a key role in better understanding the diverse culture of both parties.

Conclusion

This paper suggests that while numerous challenges may trigger the Strategic Comprehensive Partnership, there are viable alternatives that can maximize to reach a better outcome that can benefit both parties. The fact that trade and investment between China and ASEAN countries have grown against the trend since 2020 proves that a zero-sum game is harmful and unhelpful, only win-win cooperation is the right way forward.

 

References

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